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The main argument in the paper is that the bench mark of perfect competition is grossly 
inadequate and needs to be modified to recognize the sustainability of nature. Such 
recognition will lead to significant shifts of axiomatic premises in economics. The revised 
axioms could comply with premises advanced in religious doctrines and would further curb 




The perception that something is quite wrong with economics has surfaced recently with a 
fair degree of vigour. For example, the Economist (16 July 2009) carried a lead article titled 
“What went wrong with economics”. This query was followed by several critiques of 
economics – all of course centred on global financial crisis. To name a few, Nobel laureate 
Stiglitz (2011)1 questions the validity of standard economic models and their imperfections 
whilst the Australian icon Quiggin (2013)2 notes the preoccupation with issues associated 
with the Phillips Curve since its advent in 1958. I believe that these greats and many others, 
who have reasoned the failure of economics, have failed to grasp the fundamental source of 
the problem.  
 
Something is amiss in economics at a foundational level. Economics is firmly centred on the 
principles of self-interest and present aims. Given this centre of gravity for economics, social 
stewardship and altruism remain exogenous to the economic model – not endogenous within 
the model. The basic model is of course that of perfect competition. Economists argue that 
self-interest and present aims within the confines of perfect competition would lead to 
socially desirable outcomes. However, human history is more a chronicle of conquests, 
conflicts, failures and crises rather than a narrative of socially desirable outcomes. Note that 
the first financial crisis on record was in 1637 (Tulip Mania in Holland) – well before Adam 
Smith (1776)3 suggested the possibility of perfect competition as a concept. The analytic 
                                                          
1 Stiglitz, J. A., “Rethinking Macroeconomics: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It”, Global Policy, 2(2):165–
175, 2011 
2 Quggin, J. “The state of macroeconomics: it all went wrong in 1958”, e-axes, December 2013 
3 Smith, A., An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen and Co., Ltd., [ed. Edwin 
Cannan], 1904. 5th edition (1st edition W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London 1776). 




formalization of the theory of perfect competition was commenced by Edgeworth (1881)4 and 
subsequently completed by Knight (1921)5. This formalization however did not instil 
sufficient safeguards to avert undesirable outcomes such as those of the Tulip Mania.  
 
In this essay, I wish to argue that the inadequacy of the basic model of perfect competition is 
responsible, at least in part, for the succession of failures that societies have endured to date. 
Note that just within one decade (2000 – 2010) there were at least 8 major crises in the world 
without even counting the issues pertaining to climate change. My thesis is that the theory of 
perfect competition must be modified or rather extended to include sustainability as an 
explicit condition. As argued below the role of altruism and stewardship, which are indeed 
the norm of various religious teachings, are central to the attainment of sustainability. 
 
Economists of different religious persuasions – all of which have similar moral and ethical 
premises – have been reluctant to inculcate such premises within economics. Hence I present 
next two fables that I grew up with in Northern Sri Lanka (Jaffna). These fables – one from 
the Hindu tradition and the other from the Christian tradition6 – are narratives of altruism. I 
then proceed to suggest that the morals of these fables can find their way into the body of 
economics if the conditions of perfect competition are extended to include the sustainability 
of nature (and hence society). 
 
 
The Fables and Altruism 
Of the two fables – the first illustrates voluntary altruism and the other illustrates involuntary 
(or forced) altruism. 
 
Voluntary Altruism: The Celebration of Onam in many parts of Southern India is a feast to 
welcome the spirit of King Mahabali who saved the earth by his ultimate act of altruism. The 
legend goes as follows. King Mahabali was a wise and generous ruler whose popularity and 
power were both steadily growing. This was irksome to an Asura King who recruits the help 
                                                          
4 Edgeworth, F. Y., Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, 
C. Kegan Paul & Co. London, 1881. 
5 Knight, F. H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, MA 
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6 The choice of these fables does not imply that I encourage these religious faiths. It is merely that these fables 




of Lord Vishnu to curb growing power of Mahabali. Vishnu transforms himself into a dwarf 
named Vamana and arrives at King Mahabali’s palace with a request for permission to build 
three steps to sit and pray. The generous King grants Vamana (Vishnu) permission. The 
Vishnu who used his powers to become a dwarf now transforms himself into a huge giant and 
starts building the steps. The first step covers the heavens and the second step covers the 
skies. King Mahabali realizes that if the third step is built, it would cover and crush the entire 
earth. So, the kind and generous King offered his head to be the third step so that the earth 
may be spared – an ultimate gesture of voluntary altruism – the earth is safe and life goes on. 
Onam marks the day when the Gods allow King Mahabali’s spirit to mingle with his people. 
 
Involuntary Altruism: Although I recollect this fable from a Church forum in the 1960s, I was 
able to locate its narrative by O’Shea (2001)7. The fable concerns the aspirations of three 
trees that get transformed into acts of altruism. These three trees had a conversation about 
their after-life, namely how they would be transformed when felled. The first tree said: “I 
love babies – I want to be transformed into cradles where babies are rocked to sleep”. The 
second tree said: “I want to see the whole world – I want to be transformed into a big ship 
that would sail across the vast oceans”. The third tree sad: “I want be left alone – I want to 
grow up and point the whole world to heaven”. The foresters came with their tools. They 
chopped the first tree. Despite the tree’s plea to be turned into cradles, it was turned into a 
manger for resting livestock and storing hay. It was in this manger that Baby Jesus was born. 
The foresters went to work on the second tree. To this tree’s dismay they converted the tree 
not into a big ship but into an ordinary fishing boat. It was on this boat that Jesus stood on the 
shores of Galilee preaching his sermons to the masses. The foresters began chopping the third 
tree. The tree pleaded to be left alone to meet its aspiration of pointing the world to heaven. 
But it was chopped and turned into a cross. On this cross, Christ was crucified. All three trees 
were forced to do something that they had not intended – but they ended up generating far 
greater benefits to humanity (at least from the Christian perspective) than they would have 
otherwise. 
 
Both fables outlined above portray the greater good from the pursuit of altruistic goals – 
forced or otherwise. Sustainability is explicit in the first fable. Moderation, a pre-requisite for 
                                                          





sustainability is conveyed in the second fable. A brief discussion of the sustainability 
principle is now in order. 
 
 
Sustainability of Nature and Economics 
A basic tenet in the economics of sustainability is that maintaining a steady stock of nature – 
otherwise referred to as environmental capital – is a necessary condition for economic 
sustainability. This is because nature plays a foundational role as both a source and a sink for 
the economy. It is a source for the basic resources the economy needs and a sink for the 
wastes which the economy generates. The depletion of the source and the filling up of the 
sink are invariably synonymous. Environmental capital is in fact a system of natural 
endowments that are connected through a complex network of bio-physical linkages without 
any geographic boundaries. Climate change is in fact a result of the breakdown of these 
linkages. It is hence imperative that at least some bare minimum of environmental capital 
stock must be maintained in order to maintain economic systems. This requirement is 
notwithstanding the need to conserve and expand the stock of natural endowments. Yet for 
many economists natural endowments are not essential. The following statement by Mankiw 
(2004)8 represents the beliefs of most economists: 
 
"Although natural resources can be important, they are not necessary for an economy to be 
highly productive in producing goods and services. Japan, for instance, is one of the richest 
countries in the world, despite having few natural resources. International Trade makes 
Japan’s success possible. Japan imports many of the natural resources it needs, such as oil, 
and exports its manufactured goods to economies rich in natural resources." 
 
This is clearly a mistaken view on at least two grounds. First, natural resources are not simply 
extractable resources like oil. As indicated, they are a collection of linked endowments 
(including oil) that constitute ecosystems. Scientists now believe that it would be unwise to 
isolate ecosystems to local contexts given their global connectivity. That is for example, 
when oil deposits are extracted in one location the after-effects such as earthquakes can be 
felt elsewhere. Second, the potential to trade in extractable resources does not preclude the 
vital role of essential resources such as the air we breathe and the water we drink. In this 
                                                          




context, then, the term sustainable economic growth is in fact an oxymoron. The economics 
of trade that Mankiw refers to fails to acknowledge the reality of global ecosystems. These 
misconceptions have their roots in the theory of perfect completion – where the sustainability 
principle is visibly absent. 
 
 
Changing the Perfect Competition Benchmark 
Consider first the inconsistency between the morals of the two fables and the theory of 
perfect competition as outlined in standard texts. Economists argue that the conditions of 
perfect competition represent a mere bench mark that enables the explanation of attaining the 
greater good. This greater good is in fact the maximization of net market benefits. Because 
markets represent the transactions across all members of society, market benefits are deemed 
synonymous with society’s benefits. The standard five conditions of perfect competition 
outlined in most texts are: anonymity, homogeneity, perfect information, perfect mobility and 
full employment. The anonymity condition dictates that every economic agent is a price-taker 
and will not be able to set price. The homogeneity condition implies that specific 
commodities cannot be differentiated by their producers (for example by brand names). 
Perfect information ensures economic agents can replicate good practices and also make 
good choices. Perfect mobility indicates that desirable practices and goods and factors will 
enter without barriers whilst undesirable ones will exit. As the term suggests, full employment 
means that every resource is fully utilized. When all of these conditions work together – the 
maximization of net benefits unfolds, and this represents the basis for explaining how a 
perfect market works in terms of: what goods should be produced, how much of such goods 
would be produced and how these goods could be produced. The formalization of the theory 
is to demonstrate the emergence of demand and supply and a unique market equilibrium price 
(P*) and quantity (Q*) at which net benefit to society is maximum. Any deviation from the 
market equilibrium (P*, Q*) would result in a smaller net social benefit. Note that the larger 
the market the larger the net benefit to society. Hence formalization of the market and perfect 
competition also lends credence to an important axiomatic distinction between a good and a 
bad. That is, a good is one where more is preferred to less and a bad is where less is 
preferred to more. 
 
Consider now the implications of adding a sixth condition – sustainability – and the bench 




now would not merely be the market configurations that maximize net social benefits at 
present – but more importantly those configurations that maximize market net benefits 
indefinitely over an infinite time horizon9. In this context, then, the axiomatic definition of a 
good could be one where less is preferred to more. 
 
Had the conditions of Sustainable Perfect Competition been the norm in economics, then the 
excesses in the markets which have been source of various crises would have been non-
existent. Further, in line with morals of the two fables, indulgent consumption and investment 
would have been replaced by modest and moderate economic behaviour. It would be 
pertinent for me to conclude with the words of one of my heroes – Kenneth Boulding 
(1945)10 on the subject of excesses: 
“Any discovery which renders consumption less necessary to the pursuit of living is as much 
an economic gain as a discovery which improves our skills of production.” 
 
 
                                                          
9 I have provided a formal treatment of this conclusion in my work – for example see:  
Thampapillai, D. J., “Perfect Competition and Sustainability: A Brief Note”, International Journal of Social 
Economics, Vol. 37(5): 384 – 390, 2010; and Thampapillai, D. J. and J. A. Sinden, Environmental Economics: 
Concepts, Methods and Policies, Oxford University Press, Melbourne (2nd edition), 2013. 
10 Boulding, K., "The Consumption Concept in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, 35(2):1-14, 
1945. 
